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SUICIDE, SANE OR INSANE, AN ACCIDENT?
NSURANCE companies of their own volition have never
undertaken to insure the risk of suicide. At first it was
held by the courts of this country that if an insured committed suicide his beneficiary could not recover, whether the
policy mentioned suicide or not. The courts declared that
suicide while sane was a fraud on the company. Ritter vs.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. Ed. 693. Later
the courts began to change their views where the beneficiary
had a vested interest on the ground that this interest could not
be defeated by the act of a third party. To overcome this
view or rule of law the insurance companies began to expressly except this risk from their policies and have continued
to do so to the present day.
Beneficiaries contended that this clause was inoperative
and invalid, but it was early held, in Bigelow vs. Berkshire
Ins. Co., 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. Ed. 918, that such a clause was
valid and enforceable. For, said the court, in an opinion by
Davis., J.: "If they (insurance companies) are at liberty to
stipulate against hazardous occupations or unhealthy climates
* * . surely it is competent for them to stipulate against an
intentional act of self-destruction, whether it be the voluntary act of a moral agent or not." The policy in this case
excepted the risk of suicide while sane or insane.
Such has continued to be the law in most states down to
the present time. However, a few states-Missouri, Utah
and Colorado in particular-believing such a clause to be contrary to public policy, have passed statutes calculated to nullify its effect.
The statutes in the three states are the same in effect, the
old Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declaring in Continental
Casualty Co. vs. Agee, 3 F. (2) 978, 983, that the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of the United States to the
Missouri statute, "looking at the object of the statute and
giving effect to the words according to their ordinary, natural meaning," was binding on the Circuit Court of Appeals
in interpreting the Utah statute. This Utah statute is identical with the Colorado statute. The Supreme Court case referred to was Whitfield vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S.
489, 51 L. Ed. 895.
The Missouri statute is as follows:
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"In all suits upon policies of insurance on life issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no
defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it be shown to the
satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and
any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void." R. S.
1919, #6150.

The Colorado statute reads:
"From and after the passage of this act, the suicide of a policyholder after the first policy year of any Life Insurance Company doing
business in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a life
insurance policy, whether said suicide was voluntary or involuntary, and
whether said policyholder was sane or insane." Colorado Compiled
Laws of 1921, j2532.

Utah's statute is identical with the Colorado statute except that in the Utah statute the word "chapter" is substituted
for the word "act" in the first phrase of the law. Compiled
Laws of Utah of 1917, # 1171.
The insurance companies naturally contended that such
statutes were unconstitutional, but the courts have uniformly
held contra. The Colorado Supreme Court in Woodmen of
the World vs. Sloss, 49 Colo. 177, referring to the Colorado
statute, said its "enactment was a legitimate exercise of power
by the state legislature" and that it was not contrary to the
provisions of either the state or federal constitutions. "By
this statute," stated the court, "the state has declared it to be
against public policy to permit insurance companies to contract against the payment of their policies, in the event of loss,
because the insured came to his death by suicide." This view
has been upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court in its later
decisions and by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, most
recently in Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Braukman, 70 F. (2) 647.
Having settled the constitutionality of these statutes, it
became necessary to interpret them, not only as to the type
of companies and policies controlled, but also as to the situations which they governed. Clearly life policies issued by life
insurance companies fell within the scope of the statutes, but
it was contended that the acts were not so limited in their
effect. Beneficiaries claimed that accident insurance policies
werecontrolled when such policies contained a provision for
payment in case of an accidental death or death by accidental
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means. The courts upheld this contention from the first, the
latest Colorado decision to that effect being Mass. Protective
Association vs. Daugherty, 87 Colo. 469.
Missouri, Utah and Colorado all have agreed that the
statutes apply to an accident insurance policy where the insured commits suicide while insane, but there is a decided split
of authority as to the applicability of these enactments in
cases of suicide while the insured is sane.
This particular point has never come before the courts
in Colorado. In this connection the case of Business Men's
Assurance Co. vs. Scott, 17 F. (2) 4, which came before the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal from the District
Court for the District of Colorado and necessitated the interpretation of the Colorado statute, since the policyholder had
shot and killed himself while insane, the court stated (p. 6),
"The question of whether the beneficiary in such a policy as
this would have been entitled to recover if the insured had
committed suicide while sane was not considered in any of
these (Colorado) cases, and the Supreme Court of Colorado
has thus far held only that suicide while insane is death by
accidental means, and covered by an accident policy providing
for death benefits." The court refused to go further than
this in interpreting the statute, but did state by way of dictum
that there was no reason why suicide while sane should be
covered by an accident policy, since suicide while sane is in no
sense of the word an accident.
The Missouri courts, in interpreting their statute, follow
the reasoning set forth in this dictum. It was held in Brunswick vs. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.
W. 45, that the statute did not apply where the insured committed suicide while sane. This court stated that such a death
was not an accident. The burden of proof was still on the
beneficiary to show an accidental death and if the proof
showed suicide while sane then the beneficiary had failed to
bear the burden. The defense of suicide need not be pleaded;
merely a denial of the accidental death, which the plaintiff
had still to pr9ve, sufficed.
The United States Supreme Court had previously interpreted this Missouri statute in a different manner in the Whitfield case, supra. However, the Brunswick case has since been
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followed by the old Eighth Circuit in the case of Von Crome
vs. Traveller's Ins. Co., 11 F. (2) 350, which held suicide
while sane to be a defense under the Missouri statute in the
above circumstance. The court rightfully based its decision
on the right of the state courts to determine the meaning and
applicability of its own state statutes and the binding effect
of such interpretation on the federal courts.
The Utah statute has been interpreted in exactly the opposite way and in the following manner. The Agee case,
supra, came before the old Eighth Circuit on appeal from the
District Court for the District of Utah. Here the insured
met his death by drowning. The insurance company attempted to rebut a prima facie case of accidental death by
introducing evidence of suicide while sane. The trial court
refused to admit this evidence. The Circuit Court approved
this ruling, stating that the defense would have been good in
the absence of the statute, but that it had been abolished by
the act. It also stated that any attempt on the part of the
insurance company to contract so as to limit its liability in
the instance of suicide was a nullity and the insurance company would be liable notwithstanding the suicide.
A writ of certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court but was later revoked by it due to the receipt
by that court of a certified copy of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Carter vs. Standard Ins.
Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 41 A. L. R. 1495, decided
while the Agee case was still before the United States Supreme
Court.
In the Cartercase, which came before the Utah courts, the
controversy was as to whether the insured's death, possibly
caused by an overdose of laudanum, was accidental or whether
he had deliberately and intentionally committed suicide. The
Utah Supreme Court upheld the beneficiary by a somewhat
peculiar holding to the effect that although suicide while sane
would be a good defense, nevertheless "after the plaintiff has
made a prima facie case of accidental death, to then permit the
defendant to prove the death was suicidal in order to rebut
the proof of accidental death would be to 'fly in the very
teeth of the statute,' and render it useless for the very purpose for which it was evidently intended." This interpreta-
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tion of the Utah statute by the Utah Supreme Court, being
in accord with the holding in the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Agee case, the United States Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to review that decision and therefore revoked the
writ of certiorari as above mentioned.
The Agee case is remarkable, for while stating that the
Missouri and Utah statutes are the same in effect and that
the interpretation of the former is controlling on the court in
its interpretation of the latter, the court yet chose to disregard
the Missouri court's interpretation of its statute and followed
the old Whitheld case. The Agee case, as well as the Carter
case, goes a long way in interpreting the statute. It writes
the contract for the parties, making the company pay on a
policy covering death by accidental means, where the death
was not an accident under any construction of the word whatsoever.
There is certainly basis for the contention that the Utah
court, in the Carter case, erred in stating that to allow the
defense of suicide while sane in the instance of an accident
policy was to "fly in the very teeth of the statute." Not to
allow such a defense gives the insured a greater coverage than
either he or the insurance company contemplated. The insured wanted to be protected in case of accident, and the insurance company was willing to so protect him, but neither of
the parties considered or believed that death in any other way
than by accident was to be covered. Yet such is the result
brought about by the court virtually making itself a party
and rewriting the instrument for the original contracting
parties.
Very recently the Colorado statute has been interpreted
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Braukman case,
supra. In this case insured died of a gunshot wound alleged
by plaintiff beneficiary to have been accidentally inflicted.
The defendants' answers averred that death occurred through
suicide while insured was sane. Demurrers to these answers
were sustained and an appeal taken. The Circuit Court
affirmed the decision of Judge Symes in the District Court
for the District of Colorado, where the action was originally
brought.
The opinion, after reviewing and discussing, among
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others, the above cases, chose to follow the rule of the Agee
case and its interpretation of the Utah statute. It also stated
that in spite of the holding by the Missouri court in the
Brunswick case, supra, it believed the reasoning and logic in
the Whitfield case decided by the United States Supreme Court
to be more sound. It further stated that the insurance companies had two courses to follow-they could either "cease
writing policies in Colorado with a suicide exemption clause
or, if necessary, to amend premium schedules to cover the
additional risks."
This decision practically settles the question in Colorado,
for although it is not binding on the Colorado courts it will
undoubtedly be followed by them. The Colorado Supreme
Court has already shown a tendency to go a long way in
requiring the insurance companies to stay well within the
letter of the law, and making it practically mandatory that
the suicide clause either be left out of the policy altogether,
as suggested by the Circuit Court, or amended to fit the statute. For in the Daugherty case, supra, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the clause was not only a nullity but also an
express and continuing denial of liability which waived the
requirements of giving notice of death and furnishing proof
of loss.
This decision, like those of the Carter and Agee cases,
overlooks the fact that such a clause is not a "denial of liability," but, rather, a limitation of liability and an excepted
risk not intended to be covered by the policy and as completely outside the scope of a personal accident policy as damage to the insured's property would be.
The result of these decisions is that the insurance companies are required by law to cover the risk of suicide although
to cover it expressly would render the policy void under the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Ritter
case, supra, which has never been overruled and which states
that "if a policy expressly provided for the payment of the
sum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind, took
his own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute,
would be held to be against public policy."
There would seem to be error in any case which allows
recovery on an accident policy where the policyholder inten-
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tionally and while in the full possession of his faculties takes
his own life: For it is certainly impossible for a beneficiary
under such circumstances to present a bona fide prima facie
case of accidental death since obviously there was no accident.
The remedies suggested by the Circuit Court in the
Brauhman case are both impractical and unjust. To force a
company to insure such a risk against its desire borders
closely on being an infringement of the constitutional right
to contract. Raising the premium rates would be inequitable
in that such action would force the policyholders who are
honest to bear the burden of paying for the policies of dishonest policyholders who, by their suicidal death, commit a
fraud not only upon the insurance company but also on the
other policyholders. The common sense and logical interpretation of the statutes, such as that adopted by the Missouri
courts, allows the imposition of fair premium rates and does
not impose an unjust burden on the majority of the policyholders.
HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN, JR., Class of 1936.

NOVEMBER DICTA NOTED
We were pleased recently to receive an inquiry from the
editor of an Eastern Bar Association magazine inquiring the
cost of reprinting 1,800 copies of the article in the November
Dicta by Mr. Frank Swancara entitled "Impolitic Reinstatement of Disbarred Lawyers," and we are now advised that
the printer has received an order for the article to be furnished
as an insert in the Massachusetts Law Quarterly.
We extend our congratulations to Mr. Swancara.

